

# Contents

<i>Preface</i>	xi
PART I INTRODUCTION	
<b>1 Public choice and public policy</b>	<b>3</b>
Individual choice in markets versus collective choice in government	3
Economic analysis and public choice	4
Individual interests and the public interest	6
Three areas of inquiry	7
PART II AGGREGATING VOTER PREFERENCES	
<b>2 The politics of left and right</b>	<b>13</b>
The distribution of political preferences	13
Electoral competition	14
Extreme candidates cannot win	17
Primaries and general elections	18
Third parties are not viable	20
Other factors	22
Aggregating voter preferences	22
<b>3 Institutions: proportional versus plurality; parliamentary versus presidential</b>	<b>24</b>
Constitutional constraints	24
Proportional versus plurality voting	25
Proportional voting and party tickets	27
Parliamentary versus presidential governments	28
Other institutional differences	29
Conclusion	30

<b>4</b>	<b>Political strategy: turnout and the distribution of preferences</b>	<b>32</b>
	Voter turnout	32
	Voter polarization	33
	Changing minds, or motivating turnout?	34
	Designing a successful platform	35
	Elections: good alternative to violence	38
	Conclusion	38
<b>5</b>	<b>Multidimensional issue space</b>	<b>40</b>
	What can prevent the issue space from collapsing to a single dimension?	40
	A cyclical majority	41
	Single-peaked preferences	42
	Institutions and stability	44
	Instability in multidimensional issue space	45
	Why are political outcomes stable?	47
	Conclusion	48
<b>6</b>	<b>Why do people vote? Rational ignorance, expressive voting, rational irrationality</b>	<b>50</b>
	Your vote will not affect the election outcome	51
	Rational ignorance	52
	Expressive voting	53
	Rational irrationality	56
	The charity of the uncharitable	57
	Conclusion	58
<b>PART III    DESIGNING PUBLIC POLICY</b>		
<b>7</b>	<b>Transaction costs and political exchange</b>	<b>63</b>
	The Coase theorem	64
	Large numbers create high transaction costs	67
	Secret ballots and transaction costs	68
	Membership in the low-transaction cost group	69
	The Coase theorem and the public interest	70
<b>8</b>	<b>Political markets: interest groups, rent-seeking, and regulatory capture</b>	<b>73</b>
	The legislative marketplace	73
	Interest group size and effectiveness	75
	Who represents the public interest?	77

	Rent-seeking	78
	Regulatory capture	81
	Conclusion	83
<b>9</b>	<b>Bureaucracy</b>	<b>85</b>
	The budget maximization hypothesis	85
	The bureau and its sponsor	87
	Bureaucrats and the bargaining process	89
	Bureaucratic efficiency	90
	Conclusion	92
<b>10</b>	<b>Political organization: districts, committees, and institutional design</b>	<b>94</b>
	Single-member districts and political competition	94
	Two dimensions of political competition	96
	The committee system	98
	Seniority	100
	Federalism	102
	Conclusion	104
<b>11</b>	<b>Political entrepreneurship</b>	<b>106</b>
	The political marketplace	107
	Factors leading toward efficiency	109
	Two types of entrepreneurial opportunities	110
	Distributive policies and political entrepreneurship	111
	Entrepreneurial bureaucrats	113
	Will political entrepreneurship create instability?	114
	Conclusion	117
<b>PART IV CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN</b>		
<b>12</b>	<b>Constitutional and post-constitutional decision-making</b>	<b>121</b>
	Politics as exchange: the unanimity criterion	122
	Optimal decision-making rules	123
	Optimal rules, more generally	124
	Evaluating constitutional rules	125
	Some criticisms	126
	Are all political decisions post-constitutional?	127
	The constitutional challenge	128
<b>13</b>	<b>Interest groups and constitutional evolution</b>	<b>130</b>
	Government as a stationary bandit	131

x ADVANCED INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC CHOICE

Interest group activity over time	133
Enforcing constitutional constraints	134
Conclusion	136
<b>14 Checks and balances: elites and masses</b>	<b>138</b>
Government growth	139
Elites versus masses	141
Conclusion	142
<i>Index</i>	145